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This article challenges the ‘regulatory license’ view that reliance by regulators on the output of rating agencies
in the s ‘caused’ the agencies to become a central part of the fabric of theUS financial system.We argue
that long before the s, courts began using ratings as financial-community-produced norms of prudence.
This created ‘a legal license’ problem, very analogous to the ‘regulatory license’ problem, and gave rise to
conflicts of interest not unlike those that have been discussed in the context of the subprime crisis.
Rating agencies may have had substantial responsibility for the Great Depression of the s.
JEL classification: K, N, G, G
There exists a widespread view about rating agencies, first proposed by Harold (),
that some sort of revolution occurred during the s in the social uses of ratings. It
originated in a rather technical way when, on  September , the Comptroller of
the Currency, William Pole (the man in charge of supervising banks with a federal
charter or ‘national banks’), announced that bank examiners had started to rely on
ratings in order to assess the solidity of a bank’s balance sheet.1 The new rule permitted
certain securities considered as safe to be favored by recording them at their face value,
rather than at their (lower) actual market price: in a context of plummeting asset prices
(this happened at the end of the horrendous summer  which saw bank collapses
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1 The ruling enabled banks to depart from so-called ‘mark to market’. Marking to market is an account-
ing procedure whereby securities held are booked at market prices. If the prices of good assets collapse,
as was the case in the summer of , this risked jeopardizing the solvency of banks, because it would
amount to banks taking massive losses. Technically, the Pole ruling provided ‘forbearance’: banks were
enabled to book at face value high-rating securities even if such securities were suffering heavy discounts in
trading.
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all over the world) this was a significant move. More importantly, the ‘favored secu-
rities’ included US Government, State and Municipal bonds as well as all bonds
enjoying any of the ‘first four ratings by statistical corporations’, as the likes of Moody’s
and Standard Statistics were known.2 By contrast, securities with lower grades from
the same corporations were booked at market price. This is how ratings made their
début in regulation.
This move, according to Harold, was a first step in a succession of far-reaching
arrangements that caused ratings to become ingrained in the fabric of the US financial
system. Indeed, following the Banking Act of  and introduction of deposit insur-
ance, ratings became tools to monitor the quality of banks’ portfolios and essentially
supervise them (Harold ). Both critics and supporters or insiders of rating agencies
agree with this notion of a series of epoch-making decisions during the s to
which the modern financial system would be heir. A Moody’s Investors Service
memorandum traces the origins of the modern cut-off between ‘investment grade’
(the four top notches mentioned in the Pole ruling) and ‘speculative grade’ (those
below) to the announcement of  September  (Fons ). Likewise, according
to Frank Partnoy (, ), an outspoken critic of the role of the agencies in the
subprime crisis, the regulatorymoves initiated in  opened the door tomodern con-
flicts of interest.3 Thanks to these moves, the agencies now controlled the marketability
of securities, something he calls a ‘regulatory license’. This created conflicts of interest
since rating agencies would derive revenues from certifying that individual securities
be proper fodder for safety-hungry institutional investors. This enormous power held
the promise of a disaster when, in the s, rating agencies succumbed to the tempta-
tion of rating the new subprime securities they hardly understood. In other words,
according to the regulatory license view, transformations in the social uses of rating in
the s were the original sin that eventually caused the subprime crisis, and the cor-
ollary is that the extirpation of rating is the first stage on the road to financial safety.
But in fact, surprising as it may sound, this reading of the crisis is also endorsed by
rating agencies such as Moody’s, whose officials have recently emphasized that they
long for the more rapid removal of the regulatory license (because it would clarify
their responsibility, they claim).4 The more recent debate has exhibited a most
curious twist, whereby rating agencies advocate removal of reference to their
grades for regulatory purposes while reports accumulate on the difficulty of excising
rating from regulatory frameworks and prudential supervision.5 It looks as if our
societies have become addicted to ratings, enabling providers of ratings to be
2 New York Sun,  September . Subsequent articles appeared in theWall Street Journal (‘% of bank
bond valuations safe’,  September) and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle (‘Comptroller of
Currency liberalizes rules on depreciated Government, State and Municipal Bonds’,  September).
3 See also White () for a related point.
4 Richard Cantor, ‘Sovereign credit ratings’, address to the BIS Seminar on ‘Sovereign Risk: AWorld
Without Risk-Free Assets?’, Basel,  January .
5 For instance, ‘Trouble of removing ratings highlighted by SEC’,  May , http://www.risk.net/
risk-magazine/news/
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comfortable with the prospect of an ostensible reduction of their role – as if they knew
better. And if this metaphor were to be continued, the rating agencies would be like
drug dealers, insisting that substances are taken at the consumer’s risk.
To understand the logic at work, it is important to take a harder, closer look at
the rise of rating, something that is missing in previous accounts by economic histor-
ians or legal scholars. This article makes a contribution by providing a novel perspec-
tive on the rise of rating as a regulatory tool.6 We suggest that before regulatory
reliance on rating was legislated by US authorities, there already existed a similar
mechanism at work, which may be called by analogy to Partnoy, ‘legal license’. As
we proceed to argue, the regulatory license built on the legal license, which the
agencies had received long before , and a case could in fact be constructed that
at the heart of the speculative mechanics of the s was something very similar
to the process that has been observed more recently. To be clear, both banks who ori-
ginated the products and those who distributed them were, already in the s, highly
dependent on the decisions of rating agencies for they benefited from ratings being
generous (as they would be able to sell more products without facing liability risks).
To show this, we examine systematically the population of reports from court cases
quoting the statistical corporations and provide empirical evidence of a legal license in
the increasing incidence of courts’ quotations of the agencies’ output in truth discov-
ery, damages assessment etc., as well as in the connotations of the language used in
opinions rendered during the period –. This trend began before the s.7
In fact, by the time Pole issued his ‘landmark’ ruling, concepts of financial prudence
had already made their way into US courts, which relied on the output of the statisti-
cal organizations to assess the behavior of trustees, bankers and brokers. As a result, the
regulatory moves of the s were significant in that they replaced court-enforced
assessments by law-making, regulation and regulatory agencies, not by placing the
output of the agencies at the center of the US financial system, for it was already
there.8
6 Classic references in the field that omit this dimension include Sylla (), Hill ().
7 We limit the investigation to the US judicial system, but evidence in support of statistical corporations’
role within the US legal and political system before the s is also to be found elsewhere. For
example, here is an excerpt from a  May  US Senate Record (Senator William H. King of
Utah speaking): ‘In  the Union Carbide Co. was absorbed by the Union Carbide & Carbon
Corporation. I have examined Moody’s Manual and I also have here the Directory of Directors in
the City of New York, –, which seems to be an accepted authority.’ Congressional Record-
Senate,  Cong. Rec.  (): .
8 As one referee rightly emphasized, our argument in fact carries weight beyond the historical period
studied here. Indeed, regulatory license cannot explain an appreciable amount of the modern use of
ratings, such as a number of ratings that are produced beyond those required or encouraged by
regulation.
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IIn this section, we examine a population of cases found to have quoted at least one
relevant statistical organization during the period –. The source is Westlaw.
Relevant rating agencies include the main players on the market during this
period, Moody’s, Poor’s, Fitch and Standard Statistics, for which consistent
manuals exist and which formed the bulk of the industry. Relevant cases are those
including language implying that one agency output is used as a tool in truth discov-
ery, assessment of damages, etc.9 An identical Westlaw query was applied uniformly
to the four agencies.10 It returned respectively  hits for Moody’s,  for Poor’s, 
for Standard Statistics and , for Fitch. Output was then manually purged,11 yield-
ing a total of  cases with  quoting Moody’s,  quoting Poor’s and  quoting
Standard Statistics (multi-quotation occurred, so the number of cases quoting a
given agency may not add up to the total of cases quoting a least one agency).
Fitch had to be dropped from the analysis because almost all the many cases retrieved
were unrelated to the rating agency.12
Evolution is summarized on Figure , which shows the rise in the incidence of
court references to statistical organizations.13 Obviously, not only was the relevance
of rating agencies for court decisions a phenomenon already present in the s,
but it can be argued that the take-off occurred in the s, before rating became
embedded in regulation.
Relative reliance on different organizations is another interesting matter to
examine. In terms of incidence, Poor’s was the leader till about  when
Moody’s overtakes it. Standard Statistics is a latecomer, with the first quotation
only in .14 By and large, during the interwar years Moody’s can be described
as the leader, with Standard Statistics gradually pulling out and catching up with
Poor’s. Poor’s relative decline ended up with the merger between Poor’s and
9 The use of ratings in legal decisions is briefly mentioned in Harold (), who gives a couple of cases.
10 Using Westlaw, we searched for the name of the respective agencies, limiting the search period to
–. See Appendix for details.
11 A case was deemed unrelated either because it involved a homonym of a rating agency (e.g. Lawson v.
State, which mentioned the theft ofMrs. Poor’s car: Lawson v. State, Miss. ,  So.  ())
or because the rating agency itself was quoted but for a reason other than being an authority (e.g. in an
appeal to court ruling regarding an action to rescind a contract ‘of a sale to plaintiff upon the ground of
false representation made by the defendant Henry W. Poor, or Dennie M. Hare [an employee of
Poor’s]’, where Henry W. Poor & Co. was being sued for ‘inducing the plaintiff of such purchase’.
Willets v. Poor et al.,  A.D. ,  N.Y.S.  ()).
12 Previous research suggests that Fitch was the smaller in the group (Flandreau, Gaillard and Packer
).
13 Therewere  cases involving several rating agencies;  cases involvedMoody’s and Poor’s,  involved
Moody’s and Standard Statistics. No cases had reference to more than two rating agencies.
14 This reflects the chronological ‘entry’ of these various entities in the market for expertise. Poor’s had
an early presence as a reliable monitor of railroad securities. Moody’s was started in . Standard
Statistics was only started in .
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Standard Statistics in .15 Interestingly, this ranking coincides with what is known
of the industry’s league tables in terms of size, breadth of coverage, etc.16
I I
The occasions for relying on the statistical organizations’ output were varied. The
‘output’ that features in the court reports included chiefly the manual (which
described and rated the securities) but also, when it existed as a separate product,
the price list. Our imperfect, but heuristic typology relies on the parties involved in
the lawsuit. Three main categories are identified (by declining order of importance
in our population of cases): () taxman and corporate; () trustee; () brokers and/
or stock sale fraud.17
Tax cases include disputes between a taxpayer and the taxman (Commissioner of
Internal Revenue) and the output of the statistical organizations is used for ascertain-
ing the veracity of some data (price, worth etc.). For example, in Isaac L. Merrill v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue18 the petitioner, Isaac L. Miller, purchased Russian
Figure . Number of cases per period (individual and joint)
Source: Authors’ computations, from Westlaw.
15 This is interesting as this conclusion matches observation by previous authors of the leadership of
Moody’s, and gradually Standard Statistics, during the interwar period.
16 See e.g. Flandreau, Gaillard and Packer ().
17 This leaves out a small number of cases. Union Electric Light & Power Co. v. Snyder Estates et al.,  F.d
 ();Commissioner of Banks v.Chase Securities Corporation Brandegee v. Same, Mass. , N.
E.d  ().
18 Miller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,  B.T.A.  ().
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Government bonds ‘during the years from  to ’, bonds which the Soviet
Government repudiated in February . The bonds, however, ‘were continuously
quoted on the market at a low price and were sold through a broker at a price far
below their cost to the petitioner’,19 and were hence viewed by him as falling
under section (e) of the Revenue Act of , which under certain circumstances
allows for deductions from gross income. ‘The records of the Standard Statistics Co.’20
were used to reconstruct the price evolution of the ‘bonds of the Russian
Government (Fifth War Loan)  /’s, ’21 and sort the valuation issue. To this
type of lawsuit we may add ‘corporate’ ones, which typically pitted one company
against the other and where the products of statistical organizations were used to ascer-
tain the bare facts of the case.22
In ‘trustee’ cases, trustees feature as defendants in suits filed for mismanagement of
entrusted money. In such cases, statistical organizations acted in the capacity of instru-
ment of evidence. This could be done indirectly, with the court relying on the
material in one manual to demonstrate imprudence of the trustees. For example, in
, in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’ Green v. Crapo23 the ‘question
whether, having money to invest, the trustees were justified in buying [certain com-
pany’s] bonds’24 was examined under the light of Poor’s Manualwhich showed that in
‘ and ’25 the company ‘did not even pay its expenses’.26 In other cases,
reliance was not merely on the technical facts, which the court then used to make
its own inference (a loss-making company cannot be a sound investment, in the pre-
vious example), but on the organization’s opinion itself. For example, in a  case,
where the trustee is said to have benefited from discretionary powers, the audit judge
turned to Moody’s in order to assess the adequacy of a certain investment, made in
 at . but trading at  to  at the time of the audit: ‘In Moody’s Manual
for , these … bonds are rated: “Security, very high; Salability, good; net
rating, A.” His manual gives the facts from which this conclusion is drawn. It




22 A characteristic example would be an anti-trust dispute such as Macon Grocery Co. et al. v. Atlantic
C.L.R. Co. et al., where the plaintiffs were wholesale dealers in groceries and the defendant a com-
bination of railway companies grouped as the ‘Southeastern Freight Association’ and accused by the
grocers of being an illegal combination in restraint of interstate trade. In the instance, the court
admitted as evidence ‘extracts from “Poor’s Manual of Railroads”, which it was testified [to be] an
authoritative treatise on the subject’. The extracts from Poor’s were used ‘to show that the defendants
were [indeed] grouped,… and that the lines of the defendants extended throughout all the territory’
concerned (Macon Grocery Co. et al. v. Atlantic C.L.R. Co. et al.,  F.  ()).
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Co. and Harrison & Co., both banking houses of this city of the highest reputation,
etc.’27
Brokers and/or stock sale fraud cases encompass suits against brokers or sellers of
securities for false representations or erroneous reporting. An illustrative example is
Henry v. Kopf in  where the ‘defendant sought to sell to the plaintiff certain
stock of the “Houdini Picture Corporation” [whose value predictably vanished!],
and made therein certain material misrepresentations of fact to the plaintiff, and
thereby fraudulently induced the plaintiff to purchase  shares of such stock at
$ each; that said shares of stock were of no value’.28 Claiming misrepresentation
on behalf of the broker (who had mentioned a dividend that could be as high as
 percent) the plaintiff asked for reimbursement. In the hearing before the
Superior Court of New Haven County the plaintiff produced as witness one R. S.
Bradley, a banker, who ‘testified that … he examined Moody’s Current Rating
Book as to the stock’29 and this is how he could see that the stock was worthless.
I I I
From poring through these cases, it appears that courts used the products of statistical
organizations as both reliable fact-establishing outlets and providers of significant
opinion. Indeed, the language of more than one court report construes the various
products of early rating agencies as representative of ‘established opinion’. Poor’s
Manual was a ‘well known publication of railroad statistics’ (),30 an ‘authority
upon the amount and value of the stocks and bonds’ (),31 and was ‘testified an
authoritative treatise on the subject [of Railroads]’ ().32 Before buying securities,
one orator consulted ‘Poor’s Manual, and found therein a pretty full history’ ().33
In a  case, a testimony was received that the Chairman of the Board of Calumet &
Chicago Canal & Dock Co, in order to investigate anomalies in balance sheets, would
‘consult different financial magazines, such as the Economist and Poor’s Manual’.34 In
another case decided in , an investor ‘did not knowwhether [one road] would be
a good investment…He also testified that he knew that Poor’s andMoody’s Manuals
were the best publications.’35 In  Moody’s Manual is said to be describing a trans-
action ‘with exactness’.36 In a case from , a witness testified that ‘he gathered his
information concerning this stock from various publications, particularly from the list
27 In re Detre’s Estate,  Pa. ,  A.  ().
28 Henry v. Kopf,  Conn. ,  A.  ().
29 Ibid.
30 Chicago, R.I. & P. RY. Co. v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co.,  F.  ().
31 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Dodge County,  Neb. ,  N.W.  ().
32 Macon Grocery Co. et al. v. Atlantic C.L.R. Co. et al.,  F.  ().
33 Smythe v. Central Vermont Ry. Co.,  Vt. ,  A.  ().
34 Calumet & Chicago Canal & Dock Co. v. Stuckart,  Ill. ,  N.E.  ().
35 In re McDowell et al.,  Misc. ,  N.Y.S.  ().
36 Eisner v. Macomber,  U.S. ,  S.Ct.  ().
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published by the Standard Statistics Company’.37 Therefore, by the time the 
decision was taken, ‘market quotations and other financial data appearing … in the
regularly published reports of business surveys, … Moody’s Manual, Standard
Statistics, and other like publications’38 were acknowledged as ‘an authority upon
the amount and value of the stocks and bonds of … corporations in this country
[the United States]’.39 Thus it is that, while the s did see an inflation of similar
statements, court recognition of the agencies as valuable providers of information
was a significantly older phenomenon.
This recognition, however, may be construed in a rather modest way as the admis-
sion by courts of documents thought to be transparent to brute fact. This would have
been as opposed to their exclusion of agencies’ output as ‘hearsay’, a position which
would have required Mr Moody or some other to come in person and testify. This
interpretation may be supported by two cases where lower courts refused to admit
agencies’ output (presumably because they were hearsay). In Trakas v. Cokins
()40 a broker sought to disprove his wrongdoing by showing how the security
was described by Moody’s Manual, but was prevented by a lower court from doing
so; however, the Appellate Court of Illinois First District ruled that the lower
court’s decision to ‘refuse to permit defendant to testify that [Moody’s Manual of
Railways and Corporation Securities of ] was a standard manual for ’41 was erro-
neous and found in favor of the broker (appellant), asking for a retrial.42 A few years
later in Henry v. Kopf (),43 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut found
that a court in New Haven had erred in refusing evidence about Moody’s Manual.
When asked ‘if [Moody’s] was a “recognized authority”, upon objection of the ques-
tion’44 the witness did not answer. The lower court had also ruled that if Moody’s
Manual had been produced it would not admit it. In ordering the retrial, the
Supreme Court pointed to the exclusion of evidence. In its decision it commented
that the reports such as that of Moody’s, ‘based upon a general survey of the whole
market, and … constantly … acted upon by dealers’ are ‘far more satisfactory and
37 Brown v. Gray & Wilmerding,  S.W.  ().
38 Mount Vernon Trust Company, Emily F. Whitmore v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,  WL 
(B.T.A.) ().
39 Evidence on the capitalization of companies, such as the Brown-Lipe Gear and Continental Motors
Corporation in the taxpayer’s action of Brockway Motor Corporation v. City of New York from ,
would thus be presented ‘according to Poor’s, [Moody’s or Standard Statistics’] manual[s]’
(Brockway Motor Corporation v. City of New York et al.,  Misc. ,  N.Y.S.  ()), while
for presentation of the pricing of bonds the ‘publications were offered and received in evidence’
(Dubuque Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,  WL  (B.T.
A.) ()).




43 Henry v. Kopf,  Conn. ,  A.  ()
44 Ibid.
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reliable than individual entries, or individual sales or inquiries’ and concluded that
‘courts would justly be the subject of ridicule, if they should deliberately shut their
eyes to the sources of information which the rest of the world relies upon, and
demand evidence of a less certain and satisfactory character’.45 According to this
interpretation, the manuals entered into courts the way the Farmer’s Almanac did: as a
natural and legitimate instrument to tell the financial weather – an instrument which
courts would have been ridiculous not to use liberally. There is no doubt that this
interpretation is particularly plausible when the most ‘technical’ output (such as
pricing) was used. In such cases, the agencies were not that different from the
Farmer’s Almanac, telling people whether it had been a warm or a cool financial day.
IV
Thus one aspect of the growing reliance on ratings has to do with their merit as tech-
nical sources of information. On the other hand, the language found in a number of
cases (especially those involving brokers or trustees) reveals a pattern, which invites an
alternative interpretation of the growth of courts’ reliance on ratings agencies – one
whereby the enforcement by courts of rating opinions granted the agencies a
genuine legal license. Indeed, if one looks at the language used in courts when
the legitimacy of the agencies’ output is discussed, one finds that, in all cases where
motivations for the use of an agency’s manual are stated, no direct endorsement by
the court is offered; instead, it is said that the manuals or agency’s output represent
a kind of benchmark conventionally accepted by the banking and security’s trading
profession.
To quote just a few excerpts in a long list of supporting statements: in  a dis-
cussion of the contents of one edition ofMoody’s Manual is followed by the inference
that through the statements made in the manual certain properties of the security
become apparent to ‘financiers and investors’.46 In Henry v. Kopf just discussed,
the higher court stated that in so far as the expert called by plaintiff ‘was found to
be a dealer in stocks and acquainted with the market value of stocks’,47 ‘he was a
proper witness as to what market reports are accredited as trustworthy’.48 In ,
a testimony is received ‘that such books as the publications of “Standard Statistics”
are used and relied upon in the banking and security trading world’.49 In a 
case, it is said that the vice president of Stanley Corporation’s duties included ‘the
reading over of Moody’s and Standard Statistics investment service’.50 In a 
case, it is declared that ‘all of the banks admittedly subscribed’ to ‘Moody’s and
45 Ibid.
46 Eisner v. Macomber,  U.S. ,  S.Ct.  ().
47 Henry v. Kopf,  Conn. ,  A.  ().
48 Ibid.
49 Commercial Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,  B.T.A.  ().
50 Stanley Securities Co. v. United States,  Ct.Cl. ,  F.d  ().
UNDERSTANDING RATING ADDICTION 
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S096856501300022X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 15:01:47, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
other statistical manuals’.51 In other words, the point is that the courts were striving to
rely on the financial industry’s own recognized standards. This amounts to the sanc-
tioning of a form of self-regulation (a mechanism that is substantially similar to the
mechanism that has been said to be at the heart of the subprime crisis).
We suggest interpreting this ruling strategy as stemming from the ‘prudent man
principle’, which, according to previous writers, was forged in the US by Harvard
College v. Amory ().52 In this landmark case, it was decided that Trustees
should ‘observe how men of prudence manage their own affairs, not in regard to
speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering
the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested’.53
As J. H. Langbein put it, a result of Harvard College v. Amory was that ‘the standard
of prudent investing was the standard of industry practice’.54 Of course, defining
the industry practice must have been a challenge for the courts, which would have
to weigh one entry against the other. Alternatively, if the community had grown
its own handbooks, then it would be much easier to identify ‘speculative’ invest-
ments. Significantly, this expression comes up quite often in our database of cases
quoting the authority of statistical agencies, as opposite to prudent, or the case being
‘conservative’ or ‘high rating’ investment (thus belying attempts to find in the 
OCC ruling the origin of the investment versus speculative grade wording).55
51 Kelly v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. et al. Bigelow v. Kelly et al.,  F.Supp.  ().
52 Harvard College v. Amory Pick,Harvard College v. Amory Pick, Mass.  (); of course we recog-
nize that the law has many standards like ‘reasonable person’ in many different contexts. But the
prudent man principle seems the most logical reference, given the language we came across.
53 Woodruff (), Langbein ().
54 This differed from the use of legal lists as was done in Britain, where chancellors developed restricted
lists of ‘proper’ trust investments. Initially limited to first mortgages and (British) government bonds,
the list was expanded in  to East India Company stock (after the British government took over
India thus making East India a British stock), and subsequently to Colonial Bonds (Colonial Stock Act
of ). Following decolonization, the statute was amended in  to allow trustees to invest in
equities.
55 For instance, an opinion from the Orphan Court, quoted in In re Detre’s Estate,  Pa. , A. ,
(), stated that some Georgia Railway bonds ‘while not of the highest grade, were such as were
purchased by conservative investors, and considering that this trust was not limited to legal invest-
ments, and the beneficiaries were anxious to get a return of  per cent., were a proper investment
for this estate. Had interest rates remained the same these bonds would probably be convertible
today without loss’, etc. On the use of ‘investment grade’ at a fairly early date, one can quote In re
Winburn’s Will, Misc. , N.Y.S.  (), where it is said: ‘The AA rating is a high invest-
ment rating and given to few common stocks. It indicates a dominant position in the industry, tre-
mendous earning power, and ample cash resources. The rating of A comes in the investment group,
but to a lesser degree. B is the rating applied to the stocks of companies, which give the expectation
of a regular dividend payment. BA is given to a common stock when the company has shown definite
progress in its line, has built up reasonable equities for its securities, and has shown a reasonable ability
to continue dividend payments. There is a distinction between seasoned securities of the character
here involved and investments in speculative securities, etc.’ Contrast with Fons (), who
claims: ‘Thus, it appears that the term investment grade arose through market convention and
then regulatory appropriation.’
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In re McDowell et al. has a clear statement of the mechanism at work. There, one of the
trustees testified that ‘he knew that Poor’s and Moody’s Manuals are the best publi-
cations, but he could not tell whether he consulted them before or after the purchase
of the bonds’, prompting the judges to state that ‘the trustees did not employ such
vigilance, sagacity, diligence, and prudence as, in general, prudent men of discretion
and intelligence employ in like matters of their own affairs’.56
In summary, reference to rating came up in a number of situations, as a valid test to
decide whether agents had behaved in a prudent manner. It is not surprising therefore
that we came across the agencies in cases involving trustees’ investments, because trus-
tees are supposed to manage prudently the monies which they have received from
others or in cases involving banks, since banks, as emphasized by Brandeis ()
before World War I, were likewise dealing with ‘other people’s money’.
V
But if this latter interpretation is accepted, then we are dealing with a case where
courts accepted the products of the agencies without reference to what they
thought of them. It is possible or likely that courts and judges thought highly of
them (this is suggested, for instance, by an instance where Justice Brandeis quotes
JohnMoody’s Truth on Trusts, not a manual or rating book, although certainly a refer-
ence volume).57 But what exactly the courts thought is irrelevant. In the above quotes,
we are always dealing with the claim that ratings are routinely used and processed by
myriad financiers and thus somehow ‘aggregate’ the financial industry standards. Such
standards can then be used to gauge an individual’s behavior. Now, suppose that there
existed a loophole in the way ratings were being produced (too high a grade for a
certain type of product that would be really ‘crap’). Then intermediaries would
have been tempted to nonetheless distribute such ‘crap’ as they would not have
faced ex post liability – a mechanism similar to the posited logic of the ‘regulatory
license’.
Indirect evidence that is relevant to this view can be gleaned from John Moody’s
own memoir (The Long Road Home). This book provides a discussion of two interest-
ing episodes taking place in the early twentieth century.58 They are interesting,
because they underscore the existence of an early form of modern conflicts of interest.
In one episode, Moody had been contacted by the lawyers of one prominent cor-
poration (as one of the ‘largest industrial corporations in the United States’), which
56 In re McDowell et al.  Misc. ,  N.Y.S.  ().
57 Liggett Co. et al. v. Lee et al., U.S. ,  S.Ct.  (). In the same case, Brandeis also referred
to the  edition of Moody’s Industrial Securities.
58 This was when, after a successful start, JohnMoody had been bankrupted by investments made before
the  crisis. At that point, Moody had sold out his previous franchise and restarted a new business
and manual, which he meant to be more sophisticated than the previous one (this was when he began
to combine his reports with the supply of grades).
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had hired the ‘best legal talent in America’ to fight what appears to have been an anti-
trust lawsuit. They invited him into a room where he was surrounded by a ‘dozen
lawyers’ who wanted him to ‘certify the correctness of the figures’59 produced by the
said company. The figures intended to show that other firms that had not been
sued ‘had been even more guilty of gouging the public’. As Moody states, ‘the certi-
fication of an outsider would of course carry more weight with the court than any
unsupported statements presented by the defendant itself ’.60
In the other instance, Moody was approached by representatives of the ‘public
interest’ or buy-side. The context was that of the public inquiry into the ‘Money
Trust’ and he claims that individuals who pushed the inquiry (such as Senator
Robert M. LaFollette, the brothers Gifford and Amos Pinchot and Louis Brandeis)
would have ‘looked to [him] in  or  to expose the alleged stupendous
“money-trust”, which the Pujo committee in Congress attempted to chase’.61
AsMoody confesses, in both cases the ‘temptation’was there, especially in the anti-
trust case where lawyers for the big firmwould have declared that they would ‘make it
worth [his] while to do this’. Pointing to the reasons why, after playing with the idea
for ‘one afternoon’, he decided against it, John Moody suggests moral imperatives
(‘I was struggling to preserve my honor and integrity in the business world’) and
long-run unsustainability (‘Once started, there would be no stoppage; I would con-
tinue to follow this downward path. I might grow quickly rich, as there would be a
myriad of such opportunities ahead, I well knew. But I also knew that I would have to
continue to live with myself. And I turned it down’).62 In other words, the kind of
temptation John Moody acknowledges having experienced is very similar in
essence to its modern avatar in the subprime crisis, and this is suggestive.
The examples may not be perfect – since they stage Moody himself rather than his
manuals. On the other hand, with such a highly personalized branding as existed in
early statistical agencies, Moody the expert and Moody the provider of grades were
two sides of the same coin. Moreover, Moody’s testimony is not isolated. A similar
line of argument could be developed on the basis of Babson’s discussion of his
own experience as an originator of the firm that eventually became Standard
Statistics. Babson explicitly states that concerns about unmanageable conflicts of inter-
est are what led him to cash out.63 In summary, the analysis underscores the fact that,
early on, the agencies controlled a veto point, as delegated by the US court system,
that this veto point was valuable and that as a result conflicts of interest were just
around the corner.
59 Moody (), - (emphasis added).
60 Moody (), -.
61 Moody (), -. See above Liggett Co. et al. v. Lee et al., US ,  S.Ct.  (), for an
illustration of Brandeis’s interest in Moody’s work.
62 Moody’s (), p. .
63 Babson (), pp. ff.
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VI
If a license is valuable and if agencies enjoyed a legal license, then one would expect
them to be tremendously profitable before the interwar market crash. Indeed, all the
intermediaries whowere concerned about demonstrating good behavior (banks, trus-
tees, etc.) during the phase of euphoria in the s would purchase the manuals (and
would then be able to tell the judges they had done so) and this would boost Moody’s
profits. In other words, the strong pro-cyclicality that has been observed for the profit-
ability of rating agencies during the s should be observed as well during the inter-
war period. Many observers of the modern crash have faulted the ‘issuer pays model’,
suggesting that the charging of sellers rather than buyers can have deleterious effects.
But our reasoning implies that the charging of buyers, or rather ‘trustees’ or delegated
agents for the investors, is likely to have similar consequences.64
There is a dearth of statistical information on the financial performance of the
agencies during the interwar period, largely because they were private firms and
have no open records. However, Moody’s went public in late  (probably not
incidentally as this was a year of financial euphoria and booming profits) and as a
result of disclosure rules for NYSE securities, some data for Moody’s from  to
 is available at Harvard Business School’s Baker Library (and since Moody’s
was the market leader this is valuable proof). This material enabled us to construct
Figure , which shows the nominal operating income and Moody’s stock price
(Dow Jones Industrial adjusted).65 The result is striking: the behavior of both statistics
was strongly pro-cyclical. Mirroring movement in sales, Moody’s stock price plum-
meted following the market crash of , more than the Dow Jones, and kept
falling until . Moody’s stock price started recovering after , thus essentially
amplifying stock market trends.
A complete examination of the sources of historical fluctuations in the profitability
of rating corporations is beyond the scope of this article (and perhaps not feasible at all
give the fragmentary character of extant data), but at first blush, we can use Moody’s
own  Report where the subject of the dramatic decline of revenues in  is
discussed:
No field of business activity in America has been hit any harder this past year than the general
banking and investing field. This fact has naturally affected the business and profits of your
company very intensely. The markets for the types of goods and services which your
company produces have been very seriously curtailed. Over eighty per cent of our Manuals
are ordinarily sold to stockbrokers, bond dealers, investment houses and banking institutions;
our various forms of investment and advisory services are also sold to these same interests, or to
private investors, a large percentage of whom, in bear markets and hard times, are not actively
interested in the investment markets and will not spend money for any form of service.66
64 For a conventional discussion of the history of charging schemes, see Cantor and Packer ().
65 Moody’s was the only stock market listed agency (it had been listed in ), explaining why some
details are available. We are grateful to Norbert Gaillard for assistance with the data.
66 Baker Library, HBS, Annual Report ,  November .
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This quotation underlines, first, that then just as now, part of the revenues of rating
firms came from advisory and, second, that a large fraction of the revenues from
sales of manuals came from the financial industry. This makes sense given what we
have argued about ratings that would be used in the case of litigation. Thus, the
myriad small unit banks across the country that acted as distributors of New York
issued securities, the large web of stockbrokers who chased customers, and the
investment banks who needed the ratings to demonstrate good behavior were the
principal subscribers of rating services. After , thousands of small unit branches
went bust. Brokers or investment banks no longer needed to demonstrate goodwill
since origination and distribution had stopped. When examined closely, the investor
pays/issuer pays dichotomy becomes less clear, because many subscribers of the
manuals had an evident interest in the boom. Issuing activity evidently contributed
a large fraction of the rating industry’s revenues, thus explaining the boom–bust
pattern.67
In summary, we are struck by the fact that conventional arguments about regulat-
ory license and the great subprime disaster appear to neglect the fact that agencies’
conflicts of interest are not new. This article suggests one reason for this: namely,
Figure . Moody’s stock price (DJ adjusted) and pre-tax net operating income (nominal)
Source: Authors’ computations from the Wall Street Journal and Baker Library. Net operating
income (pre-tax is fromMoody’s returns in HBL; fiscal year ends September). Stock prices for
Moody’s preferred stocks (annual averages) are from Moody’s own annual reports, and
adjusted using the DJ Industrial Average (Moody’s listed itself in its own manual along with
industrial companies). Operating income for  and  is missing.
67 For a different tack on the pro-cyclicality of ratings, see Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz ().
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that before the regulatory license there was a legal license.68 This urges us to both sca-
pegoat less the rating agencies’ regulatory license when we observe it and to be less
comfortable when we don’t.
VII
Upon reflection, finding that regulatory license was heir to legal license may not be so
surprising (but one would have liked this to be a more prominent part of the recent
debate over rating agencies and their regulation). An important tradition of scholar-
ship in law and economics has discussed the reasons for choice between common law
and regulatory law as proper instruments to enforce rights (Shavell ; Posner ).
Other scholars have discussed aspects of the historical transition from common law to
regulatory law, which they have associated with the Progressive and/or NewDeal Era
(Landis ; Glaeser and Shleifer ). Our evidence suggests a similar process in
the realm of ratings. Rather than regulators suddenly reaching out for (ill-conceived)
ratings we have emphasized the existence of a seamless transition between court arbi-
tration and regulatory arrangements.
A good illustration of this transition is provided by the way early state statutes adopted
after  and ostensibly designed to protect investors against fraudulent schemes ended
up relying on the courts. ‘Blue Sky Laws’ (as they were known, since fraudulent schemes
included the sale of real estate ‘in the blue sky’; Macey andMiller ) were intended to
limit ‘speculative’ investments. Some ‘safe’ investments (such as state bonds) were expli-
citly listed but in other cases statutes included more ambiguous language. In Trakas v.
Cokins (), the issue was a section of the State of Illinois’ Blue Sky Law which men-
tioned that among the securities that could be lawfully sold in Illinois were ‘securities listed
in a standard manual or in manuals approved by the Secretary of the State of Illinois’. As
we saw, the defendant, a broker, had been prevented by a lower court from testifying ‘that
[Moody’s Manual] was a standard manual of ’ and the higher court found this was
erroneous, so that eventually the Illinois Blue Sky Law was relying on the agencies. In
effect, however, the regulator had waited for the courts to decide what was meant by
‘a standard manual’. The authors of state statutes must have meant Moody’s, Poor’s or
Standard Statistics, courts found.69
68 Incidentally, the Comptroller of the Currency’s ‘pro-rating agencies’move in  does not seem to
have been successful at preventing the decline of Moody’s indicators at least over the short run. If stat-
istical agencies received a new license in the s, this should have shown up in their operating
income, stock price or both. Presumably this is because their new relevance would have consolidated
their market power, and enabled them to capture a regulatory rent. According to this line of reason-
ing, the agencies’ performance during the Great Depression should have been somewhat anti-cyclical,
because the new regulation, occurring in , would have acted as a buffer. Obviously, our evidence
only indicts the most simplistic interpretation of the regulatory license view, which nobody to our
knowledge ever upheld.
69 Trakas v. Cokins, trading as Cokins & Company,  Ill.App. ,  WL  (Ill.App.  Dist.)
(). Another interesting case showing the early reliance by regulators on rating agencies is
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From this vantage point, the Comptroller of the Currency’s  ruling was just
bucking the trend (in this sense his own liability was addressed by the practice of the
US judiciary). And indeed, if one examines more carefully the historical record on
the alleged turning point of , one is bound to realize that the ‘landmark’ decision
was made in language that suggests bank examiners (to whom the instruction was
directed) were already familiar with the matter: the wording of the original instruction
assumed that examiners knew what a rating was and how to use it, and it also identified
four agencies as – legitimate? – providers or such grades.70 The rather concise instruction
it gave provided no further elaboration, and this implies that Pole understood that bank
examiners understood how towork with the agencies’manuals and grades. Likewise, it
appears from archival evidence that the instruction dated back to August, two weeks
before the official announcement. By announcing it about twoweeks later and empha-
sizing that he would rely on rating agencies’ grades, Pole was probably attempting to
reassure markets. But how could this possibly be reassuring if nobody knew what
ratings were? These facts do not square very neatly with the view of a revolution
brought about by a  ruling coming ‘out of the blue’.
Some may emphasize that there was still a discontinuity after  because regula-
tors can do things far more abstract and dangerous than common law courts. One is,
according to the regulatory license view, the granting of a privilege that is not ‘bound’
by performance. But our evidence suggests that this is probably too optimistic a view.
The authority the US courts delegated to Moody’s and others in the first half of the
century was not merely limited to ascertaining facts at hand. They recognized the
grades and financial opinions as a relevant benchmark of prudent practice. But such
opinions were nothing but the ‘wisdom of the industry’ and we fail to see the funda-
mental difference with today. What if the industry at large fails, which obviously has
been the case in the subprime crisis and arguably was the case in the interwar crisis?
In fact, when discussing the modern failure of rating agencies few realize that it had a
precedent in the agencies’ ‘inability’ to predict the  bond debacle (although this
interwar ‘failure’ has been documented statistically; Braddock , Flandreau et al.
Commissioner of Banks v. Chase Securities Corporation Brandegee v. Same,  Mass. ,  N.E.d 
(), which quotes the testimony of an inspector of the Department (the Massachusetts
Commissioner of Banks) to show that in ,  and  it was a practice of the Commission
to accept information from ‘[Moody’s and Poor’s Manual] in lieu of statements or questionnaires’.
70 Correspondencewith theOffice of the Comptroller of Currency, August ; USNational Archives
and Records Administration, Dept of the Treasury Office of the Comptroller of Currency; National
Archives Building, Washington, DC. The instruction (dated  August  – almost two weeks
before the official announcement to the press) reads: ‘TO ALL CHIEF NATIONAL BANK EXAMINERS: With
further reference to bond depreciation, you are requested immediately upon reception of this letter, to
instruct your examiners to show the rating of each issue on the margin opposite the “estimated
market value”. Please also explain to them that, until otherwise instructed, this office will not require
the charge off of any depreciation on bonds of theUnited States Government, of states counties, ormuni-
cipalities thereof, or other bonds which have the following rating [there follows a table showing the top
rating for four different agencies, with the corresponding “natural language” interpretation, ranging from
“High Class” (or AAA as per Moody’s) to “Good” (or BBB).’
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). This is too short an article to demonstrate that the legal license contributed to the
interwar debacle. But we have provided some evidence supporting the view that if
anyone believes in the story that the regulatory license caused the subprime crisis,
then they should be prepared to consider that the legal license was a significant
element of the interwar problems and, as a result, that there is something deeper involved
and there are more ‘pernicious’motives behind our inextinguishable thirst for rating.
VIII
This article has offered some background to the ‘landmark’ regulatory decisions taken
in  and during the following years and which are said to have caused rating
agencies to become ingrained in US financial capitalism. This view of an epoch-
making transition in  is held by both supporters and critics of the rating agencies.
It is associated with the concept of ‘regulatory license’ emphasized by Frank Partnoy.
The alternative we have articulated in this article is that, by the time the  decision
was taken, the statistical organizations already had a license. It stemmed from the rec-
ognition and enforcement by the courts of norms of prudence construed as emanating
from the financial industry and of which the rating agencies were experts and arbiters.
The decision in , in our alternative scenario, would not be as significant as
suggested by the regulatory license view. In other words, what we are arguing here
is that the courts granted the agencies a property right over the ascertaining of financial
behavior, and regulators only took note of this property right.
According to this alternative, the s indeed witnessed a shift in the replacement
of court litigation (and states’ Blue Sky Laws) by federal regulation. But there was sub-
stantial continuity as to the tool on which all these supervisory arrangements relied to
judge financial behavior, and ascertain ‘investment grade’. Owing to the courts’
reliance on the expertise of agencies, the organizations were already entrenched in
the fabric of United States capital markets. Before the statistical organizations
became ‘nationally recognized’ by Federal supervisors, they had in fact been ‘recog-
nized nationally’ by US judges and this generated tensions not unlike those that have
been discovered lately. In summary, there is more to the story of the rise of ratings than
some bureaucratic conspiracy that would have taken the Great Depression as pretext.
This illustrates a serious policy difficulty, which legal scholars have recognized. In
capitalist societies, norms may arise that the community will accept and decision-
makers are naturally guided by these norms. But the problem is that adherence to
such norms may cause inferior decisions and lead to perverse outcomes (Hill ).
The twist which our study adds to such discussion is that there is a strong demand
for – in our language, an addiction to – such norms. They are enablers: could a
market exist without its operators being provided with a liability framework? In dis-
cussing ways to handle the problem, a choice is often offered between legal and regu-
latory solutions. The depressing lesson from history is that these respective strategies
may not be so different in the long run: we suspect that the outcome from law-
based management of liability in the interwar period was not so different from that
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of the modern regulation-based framework, with a Great Crash and a Subprime Crisis
respectively arising. The challenge would be to fundamentally rethink how modern
capital markets operate. Pending this, expect further addiction.
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Appendix
Three individual searches were performed on Westlaw, seeking to find hits corre-
sponding to quotations of a rating agency in the case proceedings for the years
–. The searches always followed the same blueprint namely:
Your Search: ‘search name for a given rating agency’ & da(aft  & bef )
Database: ALLCASES
For example, in the case of Moody’s the following query was implemented:
Your Search: ‘Moody’s’ & da(aft  & bef )
Database: ALLCASES
Next, the cases were each screened for the correctness of the reference. Moody’s
and to a lesser extent Poor’s were the most problematic cases, with the search
query yielding the largest number of unrelated cases.71 Whilst for Moody’s and
Poor’s only .% and .% of the cases (respectively) remained after dropping
the unrelated ones, for Standard Statistics the number is .%, with the only case
71 Amongst others, some commonly appearing unrelated Moody’s cases are the Moody’s Heirs,
Moody’s Crown or Justice Moody.
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dropped being a reference in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann () to a previous
hearing of Mr. L. H. Sloan, vice president of the Standard Statistics Company, in a
LaFollette subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Manufactures (an amusing
coincidence given the discussion by John Moody of Senator LaFollette’s taste for
rating).72
Furthermore, all cases were assigned the following attributes: ID, agency ID, agency
code, IDD, case citation, name and rating agency (Table A.). All variables of interest (inci-
dence of quotations according to the type of information, capacity in which the
agency acted, co-quotations etc.) were examined across time and recorded as indi-
cated in Table A.. Apart from the unrelated cases, all the remaining ones were fur-
thermore coded: cases were also examined for co-quotations. Namely, whenever a
case quoted more than one rating agency simultaneously a note was taken. As can
be seen from Table A., no cases had reference to more than two rating agencies.
Table A.. Attributes of quotes found
Attribute Definition
ID case ID
agency ID agency ID (restarts from  for every rating agency)
agency code ‘S’ for Standard Statistics, ‘P’ for Poor’s, ‘M’ for Moody’s
IDD combination of agency ID and agency code (‘ID’- ‘agency code’ ‘agency ID’)
case citation citation number (bibliographic reference number, as given by Westlaw)
name case name
rating agency rating agency name: ‘Standard Statistics’, ‘Poor’s’, ‘Moody’s’
Figure A.. Number of unrelated vs valid cases by rating agency
Source: Authors’ computations, from Westlaw.
72 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,  U.S. ,  S.Ct.  ().
MARC FLANDREAU AND JOANNA KINGA SŁAWATYNIEC
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S096856501300022X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 15:01:47, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
Table A.. Subcategories used in coding quotes
Category Subcategories/description
date settled dd.mm.yyyy
capacity manual, price list, expertise, services
type of information pricing, technical, safety
quote importance low, medium, high
type taxman and corporate, trustee, brokers and/or stock sale fraud, other
quote quote concerning the rating agency
info general description of the case
duplicate duplicate ID, if quoted with any other rating agency, blank otherwise
quoted with name of the other rating agency that is mentioned in the same case
Table A.. Legal cases with reference to more than one rating agency
Name Rating agencies quoted
In re McDowell et al.,  Misc. ,  N.Y.S. () Moody’s & Poor’s
Couznes v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,  B.T.A.  () Moody’s & Poor’s




Internal Revenue Collector v. Macomber,  U.S. ,  S.Ct. 
()
Moody’s & Poor’s
Abrams v. Love et al.,  Ill.App. ,  WL  (Ill.App. 
Dist.) ()
Moody’s & Poor’s
United Rys & Electric Co. of Baltimore v.West et al.,  U.S. , 
S.Ct.  ()
Moody’s & Poor’s
Commissioner of Banks v. Chase Securities Corporation Brandegee v.
Same,  Mass. ,  N.E.d  ()
Moody’s & Poor’s




Dallas Dome Wyoming Oil Fields Co. v. Brooder,  Wyo. , 
P.d  ()
Moody’s & Poor’s




Taylor et al. v. Standard Gas & Electric Co. et al.,  Fd  () Moody’s & Standard
Statistics
Source: Authors’ computations, from Westlaw.
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